In his diary from 1997, Moscow theater director Valerii Zolotukhin described Haifa in this manner during his travels in Israel. Indeed, since the late 1980-s, Haifa has become the city with the largest number of Russian-speaking residents. According to data from the Ministry of Aliyah and Absorption, by 2017, Haifa was home to about 6% of Russian-speaking immigrants from 1989-1993, just over 7% from 1994-1997, to 8% of those from the former Soviet Union from 1998-2001, and to over 9% from 2002-2012. Russian speakers make up one-third of Haifa’s population.
Many of these individuals came to Israel as adults with younger relatives during the great wave of immigration in the 1990s, when more than one million former residents of the Soviet Union arrived in Israel. These people formed the bulk of what are commonly referred to as Russian-speaking Israelis. Their political consciousness was largely shaped by the Soviet interpretation of class theory and ethno-national policy, which had been pursued for many years in the Soviet Union. Dr. Dmitrii Shumsky highlights in his studies on Russian-speaking immigration that their understanding of societal structure remained largely unchanged after relocating to Israel. While their societal position shifted significantly – for the first time, Soviet Jews found themselves among the dominant majority. This context, coupled with the general distrust of leftist discourse among recent Soviet state residents, has fostered a distinctly right-wing, nationalist stance that traditionally characterizes the political preferences of the so-called “Russian street” in Israel.
Since Vladimir Putin came to power, the Russian regime has concurrently been involved in outreach efforts with what they term “former compatriots.” Over the years, various outreach efforts have been conducted in Europe, America, and Israel – countries with significant Russian-speaking populations – to promote favorable narratives for Russia. In addition to direct on-the-ground campaigns, there has been extensive outreach to “former compatriots” through various official Russian media outlets, which continue to broadcast openly in several countries, including Israel. The active consumption of such media content, often containing hate propaganda, coupled with a lack of political literacy and an understanding of society viewed through an ethno-national hierarchy, has significantly influenced the political preferences and mindset of Russian-speaking immigrants in Israel. The appeal of Vladimir Putin’s image, crafted by Russian propaganda,which largely comprises the content of such media, has been actively leveraged by Israel’s political elites to attract the votes of Russian-speaking repatriates, among others. A significant symbolic gesture in this effort was designating 9th of May as Victory Day in Israel, aligning with Russia and several other post-Soviet countries, while the rest of the Western world celebrates it on May 8th. This decision enabled a robust propaganda campaign in the Russian media, portraying Israel and Russia as allies combating modern forms of Nazism. In Putin’s rhetoric, this enemy is Ukraine and the West, while in Netanyahu’s rhetoric, it is Iran and its proxies. The normalization of violent discourse, hate speech, and outright chauvinistic rhetoric unites the media spaces of official Russian and Israeli Russian-speaking media, both of which support Israel’s right-wing agenda. These strategies allow right-wing Israeli politicians to consistently connect with an audience that, through various information channels, receives similar arguments reinforcing the inevitability of confrontation with external enemies and the value of military power.
For nearly twenty years, such a public opinion landscape in the Russian-speaking community of Israel remained unquestioned. However, starting in the late 2010s with the consolidation of all power in Putin’s hands and its subsequent impact on neighboring countries, a new wave of mass emigration to Israel began. During this period, many middle-class individuals from major Russian cities departed, unwilling to endure the declining freedoms and onset of political repression in Russia. The active protests of 2011, followed by arrests and assassinations of political leaders, culminating in the occupation of Crimea in 2014, spurred young and capable Russians to relocate. Many of them experienced persecution firsthand or witnessed it through friends and acquaintances. Following the outbreak of conflict in Eastern Ukraine in 2014, those escaping the war in Ukraine also became part of this migration wave. According to available statistics, 23% of immigrants from this period settled in Haifa. However, it’s important to note that the challenges encountered by the Russian-speaking minority in Haifa are largely similar to those faced by the city’s general population. Issues such as insufficient job opportunities for young adults, unaffordable housing for young families, limited recreational options, and underdeveloped urban infrastructure collectively contribute to a continuous stream of young people leaving Haifa.
For some time, immigrants of this wave were primarily visible in the fields of socially and culturally oriented business. A pivotal moment in the political awakening process for many repatriates of this wave was marked by events unfolding in the post-Soviet space after 2020. The power usurpation by Belarusian dictator Alexander Lukashenko following the contested elections in the country, the violent crackdown on demonstrators, the poisoning and subsequent arrest in January 2021 of Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny, along with mass persecutions and arrests in both countries, triggered an unprecedented wave of solidarity among Russian-speaking immigrants worldwide. Amidst the crackdowns, physical violence, and torture of demonstrators in Belarus, over 500 people assembled in front of Haifa’s city hall. Russian-speaking immigrants from diverse backgrounds, arriving in Israel from various countries and cities, united to stand in solidarity with democracy activists in Belarus. Following Alexei Navalny’s arrest upon his return to Russia in January 2021, widespread protests erupted both within Russia and internationally. Over 1,000 individuals gathered at the Russian Consulate in Haifa, demanding his immediate release from custody. This protest became the largest outside of Russia. The next significant event that compelled young Russian-speaking Israelis to clearly articulate their stance on current policies was the שומר החומות – Guardian of the Walls operation in May 2021. Researchers studying the Russian-speaking community observed that these events had a profound psychological impact on many. Some respondents struggled with the notion of being citizens of a country engaged in warfare. For those who viewed themselves as proponents of progressive values in Russia and had moved to Israel seeking a “free country,” accepting their involvement in a society conducting aggressive warfare posed a serious challenge. Most of them were unprepared to align with the propagandistic narratives prevalent in Russian-language media channels, which advocated for extreme measures like wiping Gaza off the face of the Earth. Some expressed discomfort about the lack of environments where dissent seemed legitimate and widely accepted among other discussion participants..
The experiences during these events played a crucial role in shaping perspectives as the full-scale invasion of Ukraine unfolded in February 2022. Some drew parallels between the conflicts, likening Israel’s situation to Ukraine’s, viewing Israel as fighting in a hostile environment. However, for many, such comparisons felt inadequate; instead, they saw Israel’s actions as akin to aggression, reminiscent of Russia’s stance. Against the backdrop of the invasion and subsequent mobilization in Russia, over 100,000 people sought refuge in Israel. Among them, around 15,000 opted to settle in northern Israel, with Haifa attracting 10,000 new residents. Over 70% of these immigrants are Russian citizens. While detailed studies on the Ukrainian community are still underway, the investigations conducted within the Russian community shows that many of those who are relocating to Western countries after 2022 bring significant economic, social, and cultural assets with them. According to research published by the Inter-University Project on Russian Emigration, over 83% of Russian immigrants to Israel possess higher education and extensive experience in the non-profit sector. Nearly 93% had previously resided in major cities, primarily Moscow and St. Petersburg. By 2023, more than 70% were actively engaged in volunteer and civic projects in Israel, even before the outbreak of the war in Gaza. Researchers highlight that the majority of these immigrants uphold “cosmopolitan” and humanitarian values, advocate for progressive agendas, and are eager to actively participate in solidarity-based initiatives within horizontal structures.
A significant portion of these individuals arrived in Israel during the height of a political crisis and amidst attempts by the far-right government to enact judicial reforms. Concurrent with the arrival of a substantial number of people, the operations of many offices tasked with absorption were effectively paralyzed. Majority of those who arrived in Israel in 2022 and underwent emergency procedures only received all necessary documents several months later, with language courses proving inaccessible to many. The pressing need to settle into new life circumstances did not facilitate active engagement of new voters in the Knesset elections in November 2022. However, subsequent government decisions acknowledging the necessity of judicial reform encouraged many to delve deeper into current affairs and develop their own viewpoints, although some found it challenging to grasp the complexity of the situation. This dynamic was further fueled by discussions that unfolded within the Russian-speaking segment of the internet during the summer of 2022. These discussions pitted those who had immigrated to Israel from Russia a decade earlier against those who had recently arrived. Representatives of the earlier wave of immigration took to social media to engage with their newly arrived compatriots, urging them not to remain indifferent to politics. They highlighted striking similarities between the political processes they had witnessed in Russia and those unfolding in Israel today.
A pivotal moment shaping the Russian-speaking community’s stance on protests was the aggressive dispersal of demonstrators by Israeli police at one of the rallies. This display of force sparked a wave of emotions across the Russian-speaking internet. Immigrants from different waves recalled the harsh methods employed by law enforcement in Russia and Belarus, drawing on their personal experiences with security forces. Many users also drew attention to the resemblances in the official rhetoric of the Israeli government, which, much like in Russia or Belarus, accused protesters of attempting to overthrow a democratically elected government. This comparative approach, overlaying familiar traits of authoritarian regimes onto current realities, provides a significant lens through which Russian immigrants view their experiences in Israel. For many of them, participating in Israeli protests has become part of a broader resistance against dictatorship and authoritarianism, involving an active segment of the Russian-speaking community. Many immigrants emphasize that even after relocating, they continue to support civil society structures in Russia or in forced exile, including advocacy for political prisoners.
Following Russia’s war against Ukraine, several Russian groups in Haifa emerged to oppose Vladimir Putin’s dictatorship. They regularly organize demonstrations at the Russian Embassy in Haifa and various locations throughout the city, arranging solidarity evenings for Russian political prisoners and Ukrainian refugees. These groups have become leading activists, organizing a column of new repatriates in a weekly Saturday protest under the slogan, “We lived under dictatorship and don’t want it anymore!” Similar groups have formed in other cities across Israel; in Haifa alone, they number over 300 people, with over 200 in northern cities like Acre and Carmiel where activists are particularly active. The recent activism among immigrants of the latest wave did not find strong support from the established Russian-speaking community, whose political views shaped in 1990-s. An illustrative example of the generational and cultural gap surfaced in a social media dispute that, while not explicitly political, starkly underscored the contrasting perspectives and lifestyles among these immigrant groups.
In 2022, Tatiana Sheremet, a recent immigrant from St. Petersburg, found herself at the center of controversy within an online community group when she remarked on the absence of pumpkin spice latte in Israel. What might have seemed like a casual observation quickly ignited a backlash in the Russian-speaking segment of Facebook. Critics accused Tatiana of showing reluctance to integrate, misunderstanding local norms, and unfairly criticizing Israel without having earned the moral authority to do so as a newcomer. Additionally, critics pointed out the inappropriateness of such complaints amidst the ongoing war in Ukraine. They accused those who only left Russia after the full-scale invasion began of hypocrisy, suggesting their motives were more about seeking bourgeois comfort rather than genuine ideological opposition to war, especially in light of Russia’s increasing international isolation. This discourse reflects deeper tensions within the Russian-speaking community in Israel, where differing attitudes towards integration, national identity, and political engagement are becoming increasingly pronounced among immigrants from different waves of migration.
This story has become so emblematic that it has resonated as a meme across Russian-speaking communities worldwide, shedding light on the intricate circumstances – both external and internal – faced by Russian immigrants. Many among them genuinely reject war, political repression, and any form of state aggression, whether in foreign or domestic policies. However, as representatives of the middle and upper-middle class in Russia, they are also sensitive to personal comfort, shaped by the development of urban infrastructure, the openness of local communities, the transparency of the business environment, and the activity of municipal governance. Simultaneously, this public argument has underscored another division within Israel’s Russian-speaking community. The pain and subsequent reluctance of some Ukrainian immigrants to engage with Russian citizens, irrespective of their political views, are shaping a new social reality. Since February 2022, many former Ukrainian residents have critically assessed the recent wave of emigration from Russia. In their daily interactions, many have shifted from using Russian to Ukrainian, with questions of cultural and political identity taking on paramount importance. This dynamic applies to immigrants from earlier waves as well as those who arrived directly in Israel due to the war.In response to the invasion, the Ukrainian community swiftly mobilized to support their country, leading to the establishment of the Humanitarian Aid Center for Ukrainian Refugees in Haifa in March 2022, which continues to provide essential services. A cultural center has also emerged, hosting events in Ukrainian and Belarusian languages. Several businesses run by Ukrainian expatriates have sprung up in the city. Over the past two years, the ability to conduct business in Ukrainian has become a significant marker for major institutions catering to immigrants from the post-Soviet space. Despite these divisions, there are instances of personal dialogue and efforts to address urban functionality issues that could serve as points of collaborative efforts between Ukrainian and Russian communities in Israel.
The civic mobilization experience of Russian and Ukrainian immigrants over the past two years somewhat prepared them for the events following the Hamas attack on October 7, 2023. In the initial weeks of the war, recent immigrants—specialists in production, marketing, artists, and journalists from independent Russian media—organized an online marathon to support evacuated families, raising over $1.3 million. Additionally, several charitable initiatives have emerged in Haifa thanks to small businesses opened by Russian and Ukrainian immigrants. Immigrants actively participated in volunteer projects, including assembling and delivering food to those in need. Some highlighted that engaging in such initiatives deeply connected them to current events, while others expressed regret over the inability to sustain such active social-oriented activities. Perhaps that was the reason why the municipal elections in March 2024 represented a significant point of engagement for the Russian-speaking community in Haifa. There was significant interest, especially with a fiercely contested mayoral race at stake. Among the new residents of Haifa were individuals with electoral experience from Russia, closely following the city’s municipal elections. Activists compiled a list of concerns for recent immigrants, including support for small businesses, adapting teachers and researchers, reevaluating qualifications, and integrating into sectors of Israel’s economy needing skilled professionals. Environmental issues, city planning, and public transport adaptation also weighed on many minds. Yet, many followers of the mayoral and council campaigns expressed a distinct distaste for the campaign style. Identifying suitable candidates was challenging due to the absence of clear, accessible pre-election development plans for the city, candidate communications resembling populist rhetoric rather than a focus on city improvement, and aggressive outdoor advertising tactics. Despite these challenges, the voters who went to the polls ultimately chose candidates they had become more familiar with over time, even though these candidates may not have fully met their expectations. Furthermore, only a few candidates made concerted efforts to connect with Haifa’s Russian-speaking electorate. Currently, there are several deputies in the Haifa municipality who publicly state that they advocate for the interests of Russian-speaking immigrants. Kirill Karetchnik and Tatiana Dzhun (Yisrael Beiteinu party) are among the most prominent in this regard.
The lack of effective communication channels that meet the needs of progressive Russian-speaking immigrants is evident in the changing public opinion on the Gaza conflict. Discussions on various media platforms among Russian-speaking immigrants highlight their concern about the absence of a humane discourse in the information sphere, which would enable them to perceive individuals on the other side of the conflict as human beings. Despite initial mobilization immediately after the start of hostilities, the evolving situation – highlighting the impact of military actions on civilians, the prolonged failure to release hostages, and the filing of war crimes charges against Israel – have all contributed to reshaping the perspectives of Russian-speaking immigrants on the conflict. Not long ago, many actively supported the International Criminal Court’s arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin, accused of war crimes in Ukraine. Now, they are compelled to take a stance regarding Israel’s leadership. However, not everyone is willing to support an aggressive and combative approach once again. Partially, this reluctance was influenced by the one-sided presentation of information in the dominant Russian-speaking Israeli media landscape, as well as the stance taken in this conflict by Russian independent speakers and opinion makers. Without delving into the specifics of how and under what conditions attitudes toward the Arab-Israeli conflict were shaped among journalists from liberal Russian media and public intellectuals, it is noteworthy that they mostly align with positions that coincide with Israel’s official stance. Russian propaganda, meanwhile, persists in attempting to manipulate public opinion by promoting the idea that Israel values its friendship with Russia far more than concessions to the West. However, it is important to recognize that this propaganda has minimal impact on the opinions of recent immigrants, who obtain their information from other media sources. Nonetheless, the older generation, which continues to consume content from official Russian media, remains the majority within the Russian-speaking community.
However, the voices of new immigrants are increasingly resonating. Recently, Tatiana Sheremet, mentioned earlier, made a notable statement on a broadcast of an Israeli Russian-language channel, expressing her disagreement with the perspective that all Gaza residents are dehumanized and equated with terrorists. Moreover, there are human rights projects initiated by immigrants, such as the “Civil Initiative for human rights in Palestine and Israel” and provides coverage of the conflict in Russian. Nine months into the Gaza conflict, online surveys among the most active segments of the Russian-speaking community reveal that over 45% consider multiculturalism a significant aspect defining Haifa. A substantial majority indicate they have gained valuable experience interacting with diverse ethnic and cultural groups in Haifa, harboring no negative prejudices, and are eager to participate in initiatives promoting good neighborliness. The motivation of Russian-speaking immigrants to engage in socially impactful activities, along with their experience navigating similar efforts amidst political pressures in Russia, presents an opportunity to reshape civil society in Haifa. Some respondents expressed a strong desire to participate in community projects and contribute innovative ideas for city improvement. However, they face challenges in finding effective avenues for their contributions. Haifa, like Israel overall, continually introduces initiatives aimed at Russian-speaking immigrants. Yet, many participants feel the information they receive lacks practical application. Young, proactive individuals are keen to invest their efforts in achieving concrete outcomes but often face frustration due to development of partnerships and communication dynamics.
Establishing robust civic and political representation has become increasingly crucial for Haifa’s Russian-speaking community. Supporting and integrating Russian-speaking experts within the non-profit sector could play a pivotal role in fully integrating these immigrants into Haifa’s vibrant community life. It is important to mention that many Russian immigrants, motivated by strong moral convictions and having left a country mired in aggressive war, recognize the importance of engaging in dialogue with individuals labeled as the other side. This willingness to gradually foster peace could strengthen solidarity and enhance neighborly relations in Haifa, setting a compelling example for other urban communities across Israel.
